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BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Application regarding the Conversion and Acquisition of Control of Premera Blue Cross and its Affiliates. Docket No. G02-45

THIRD ORDER: RULING ON PREMERA'S OBJECTIONS TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER

On November 26, 2002, a hearing was held at the John A. Cherburg Building, Senate Hearing Room 2, Olympia, Washington. The hearing was reported and opened to the public. Present on behalf of Premera Blue Cross and its affiliates ("Premera") were the following individuals: Yori Milo, Chief Legal Officer; John Domeika, General Counsel; and Thomas Kelly and Kirk Dublin, Preston Gates & Ellis, LLP. Present from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner ("OIC") Staff were the following individuals: Jim Odiorne, Deputy Insurance Commissioner for Company Supervision; John Hamje, Staff Attorney; and Jim Tompkins, Staff Attorney. Eleanor Hamburger and Jeff Coopersmith were present on behalf of petitioning intervenors. I was assisted by Carol Sureau, Deputy Insurance Commissioner for Legal Affairs, and Christina Beusch, Assistant Attorney General. The purpose of the hearing was to hear argument on Premera's objection to the FIRST ORDER: CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER ("Case Management Order" or "CMO") and to receive an update from the OIC Staff and Premera on the status of the Staff's request for information and Premera's responses. Prior to the hearing, the parties filed memoranda on the legal issues and

status reports. The petitioning intervenors also filed legal memoranda. I heard argument from the parties and the petitioning intervenors.

Premera objects to paragraph 1 of the Case Management Order, in which I declare that Premera's Application (also referred to as a "Form A" or the "Statement") to convert to a for-profit entity will not be considered by me to be complete until after the adjudicative hearing has concluded and the administrative record is closed. Premera asserts that the CMO is contrary to the governing statutes, RCW 48.31B.015(4)(b) and 48.31C.030(4). Premera argues that the statutory language compels the following conclusions: (1) the Statement must be declared complete prior to the hearing; (2) a hearing must be held and a decision rendered by me within 60 days after the Statement is complete; and (3) the Statement is complete when Premera has filed those documents that it asserts satisfy the requirements of RCW 41.31B.015(2) and 41.31C.030(2). Based on this interpretation of the statutory language, Premera contends that the Statement was complete on October 25, 2002; therefore, a hearing and a final administrative decision must be rendered within 60 days of that date.¹

OIC Staff takes the position that the Application must be approved or disapproved within 60 days after both the Commissioner declares the Statement to be complete and a public hearing is held. In other words, both events must occur before the 60-day period in which to render a decision begins to run. Moreover, the OIC Staff asserts that when the Statement is declared to be complete is within my discretion and is not determined by Premera or the OIC Staff.

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¹ Despite its legal position, Premera has offered to extend the date for me to make a decision until March 1, 2003. As discussed more fully herein, I will not, nor do I find it necessary, to commit to rendering a decision by that particular date.

I believe the OIC Staff's position on when the 60-day period begins to run more closely reflects legislative intent, particularly when one looks at the statutory language in context. However, even if the statute compels the hearing and the decision to occur within 60 days after only the Statement is declared complete, it is clear that I make the decision on completeness. As will be discussed more fully below, Premera's Application is not complete; therefore, under no circumstances has the 60-day decision period begun to run.

FINDINGS OF FACT²

- 1. On September 17, 2002, Premera made the initial filing of a Form A Statement with the OIC seeking the approval of the Insurance Commissioner to reorganize. The proposed reorganization would permit Premera and its nonprofit affiliates to convert to for-profit entities. Control of Premera, including affiliates, would be transferred to a for-profit holding company. As part of the conversion, a Foundation Shareholder would be created that would own 100 percent of the capital stock of the newly formed for-profit holding company. The proceeds of the sale of the stock are intended to be used, as allowed by law, for healthcare related purposes.
- 2. On September 27, 2002, Premera filed a supplement to its Statement.
- 3. On October 7, 2002, OIC Staff issued a deficiency letter identifying materials that had been omitted from the Form A.
- 4. On October 22, 2002, the OIC Staff, through one of its consultants, issued a document and information request to Premera. The request was divided into

² The Findings of Fact are based on the parties' representations in their status reports and during oral argument. The timing of the events described herein were undisputed.

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- 12. Interviews of Premera senior management by the consultants were scheduled for November 26 and 27, 2002.
- 13. The OIC Staff anticipates that additional interviews and data and document requests may be necessary before the consultants have all of the material they need to review the proposed transaction.
- 14. The consultants will produce reports of their findings, which will be given to Premera.
- 15. Premera intends to file responsive reports of its consultants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The general requirements for the contents of a Form A Statement are set forth in RCW48.31B.015(2) and 48.31C.030(2) and WAC 284-18-910. Without listing all its components, in essence the Form A Statement must describe the transaction, the parties involved, the nature and amount of the consideration, the financial condition of the acquiring party, and the future business plans of the acquiring party. However, the scope of information and the level of detail necessary to a Form A are logically dictated by the standards under which the Commissioner must decide to approve or disapprove the transaction. In deciding whether Premera Blue Cross and its affiliates may be acquired by a newly formed for-profit holding company, I will have to consider the following factors, among possibly others: (1) will the effect of the transaction substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly; (2) are there public benefits in economies of scale or availability of insurance that outweigh any reduction in competition resulting from the transaction; (3) will the financial condition of the acquiring party jeopardize the stability of the company or prejudice the interests of subscribers; (4) are the future plans of the acquiring party unfair or unreasonable

to subscribers and not in the public interest; (5) does the post-transaction management have the requisite competence, integrity, and experience; and (6) is the acquisition likely to be hazardous to the insurance-buying public. *See* RCW 48.31B.015(4)(a) and 48.31C.030(5).

Considering the breadth of the issues I am statutorily required to consider and the complexity of the transaction proposed by Premera, it is no surprise that the information initially supplied by Premera in its Form A filing has been since that time and may again have to be supplemented substantially through requests for additional information by the OIC. Indeed the Holding Company Act expressly contemplates that the Commissioner, or as in this case the OIC Staff, may ask for additional information to complete the Statement. RCW 48.31B.015(4)(a)(1)(ii)(A) and 48.31C.030(4). Furthermore, it is only when I am satisfied that Premera has supplied all the information needed to address the statutory considerations that the Statement may be considered complete. RCW 48.31B.015(4)(b) and 48.31C.030(4). Premera has taken the position that the Form A is comprised of only what it has voluntarily filed, and that the information that is being solicited by the OIC Staff from Premera is not part of the Statement. Relying on this strained distinction, Premera makes the argument that its initial Form A filing, as supplemented by it on September 27, 2002, and October 25, 2002, is the complete Form A. However, Premera's interpretation of the law nullifies the purpose of giving the Commissioner the power to request additional information and the authority to declare when the Statement is complete. Furthermore, it does not make sense to so limit what constitutes the Form A Statement in light of the broad statutory criteria for approval or disapproval of the transaction.

Based upon the facts presented in the parties' status reports, as found above, and the relevant statutory language, I conclude that Premera's Form A Statement is not complete.

The information that the OIC Staff is soliciting is relevant to the statutory criteria I must consider. The OIC Staff and its consultants have been specific in their requests, and thus far they have been diligent in their pursuit of information. It has been barely a month since the OIC Staff consultants were given free access to the documents requested and had the opportunity to conduct interviews of key people in Premera's management. Moreover, Premera has expressly stated that it intends to file reports of its consultants that will be responsive to whatever issues or concerns the OIC Staff consultants raise in their reports. I think it is appropriate that Premera be given that opportunity. Indeed, I specifically want Premera to further explain the nature and effects of its proposed transaction in light of any questions or problems raised by the OIC Staff and its experts. I will consider such responsive reports as further supplementing Premera's Statement.

My ruling on the completeness of the Statement is not dependent on adopting either Premera or the OIC Staff's interpretation of whether the 60-day window to render a decision necessarily begins after the hearing or at some point before the hearing. However, I believe that it is appropriate, as the OIC Staff suggests, to examine the timeframe for making a decision in context of the competing interests that the legislature apparently considered when adopting ch. 48.31.B and 48.31C RCW. A business transaction, such as an acquisition of control of an insurer, can be time-sensitive due to financial and market concerns. Therefore, some protections are given to acquiring companies against inaction by the regulator. See RCW 48.31B.015(b) and 48.31C.030(4). However, the business of insurance is one affected by the public interest. RCW 48.01.030. The legislature recognized this by establishing fairly broad criteria for the Commissioner to consider in deciding to approve or disapprove a proposed acquisition. In addition, persons whose significant interests are

affected by the transaction are given the ability to participate in the hearing process with the same rights as a party to conduct discovery, examine witnesses, offer evidence, and make argument. RCW 48.31B.015(4)(b) and 48.31C.030(4). Finally, the hearing itself is a contested case proceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), RCW 48.31B.070 and 48.31C.140, with all of the protections afforded participants in such a proceeding, ch. 34.05 RCW.

The interpretation of the law offered by the Staff is a reasonable one. For support, one only has to look at the provisions of RCW 48.31C.030(4) and (5). The statute permits the Commissioner to *approve* an acquisition of a domestic health care service contractor or health maintenance organization without ever holding a hearing; although, at their option, the Commissioner or a party to the transaction may request a hearing. However, the Commissioner may *disapprove* an acquisition only after a hearing. There is no deadline for requesting a discretionary hearing under RCW 48.31C.030(4) or determining that a mandatory hearing under RCW 48.31C.030(5) is necessary. The request for a discretionary hearing or the need for a mandatory hearing could occur on the third day or the fifty-third day after the filing of a "complete" Form A. If the latter scenario were to occur, an APA hearing with possible intervening participants, could not be accomplished by the sixtieth day, or at least could not be accomplished without severely prejudicing the rights of the parties, the rights of potential intervenors, and the public interest.

In addition, the timeframes set forth in the Holding Company Act for deciding on the completeness of a Statement and whether to approve or disapprove a transaction are directory.

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While the time period discussed in *Erection Co. v. Labor & Industries*, 121 Wn.2d 513, 852 P.2d 288 (1993) was jurisdictional and, therefore, mandatory, the word "shall" in RCW 48.31B.015 and 48.31C.030 regarding the 60-day decision period should be construed as directory and permissive. The plain language of the statutes does not create a jurisdictional requirement. Moreover, where important public rights and interests are involved, such as in this case, courts will not construe a statutory timeframe as a mandatory requirement. *See, e.g., Brock v. CY*, 476 U.S. 253 (1986); *Niichel v. Lancaster*, 97 Wn.2d 620, 647 P.2d 1021 (1982); *State v. Bryan*, 93 Wn.2d 177, 606 P.2d 1228 (1980); *State v. Miller*, 32 Wn.2d 149, 201 P.2d 136 (1948).

The proceedings in this matter are being conducted in full compliance with the law. Premera's objections to the Case management Order have been noted but are rejected. There is no need to amend the Case Management Order. I appreciate that Premera does not want this process to continue indefinitely, as I do not. On the other hand, I must ensure that all of the interests recognized by the legislature in the Holding Company Act are taken into account. The briefing by the parties and the potential intervenors regarding who may participate in this case has just been completed. A decision on intervention status will be issued as soon as reasonably possible. Schedules for potential discovery, pre-filed testimony, and hearing dates can be set once the identities of the participants in the proceeding are established by me. In the meantime, the OIC Staff and Premera should continue to work diligently in identifying and gathering all of the information needed in the Form A Statement in order to review the

1	transaction in light of the statutory criteria. The OIC Staff and Premera should each file		
2	written status reports with me on January 14, 2003, regarding their progress.		
3	IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of December, 2002.		
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6	MIKE KREIDLER Insurance Commissioner		
7	for the State of Washington		
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I served a copy of this document on all parties or their counsel of record		
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10	foregoing is true and correct. DATED this day of December, 2002, at Olympia, WA.		
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